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THE URBAN CRISIS AND THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT'S RETREAT: CATALYZING
PUBLIC POLICY CHOICES TO SAVE OUR
CITIES
David R. Jones*
If cities are the matrices of our civilization, if our great ideas, our
intellectual and moral consciousness comes from there, then woe
and betide us if we have a national policy to let our cities become
scenes from Escape From New York or Blade Runner, the city of
dreadful night. You can't have a policy that lets cities decline, be-
cause in the decline of cities comes the decline of everything.
-Kevin Starr, University of Southern California'
Walking the streets of my old Bedford-Stuyvesant, New York,
neighborhood, you can see the palpable decline in the level of services,
the condition of the housing stock, the number of homeless people,
the idle adults and children. These impressions of people without
hope are reinforced by horrific media accounts of child abuse, neglect
and criminal acts that are senseless at best. They reflect the sad truth
which New York City and other urban centers like it must face: the
pervasiveness of poverty.
Not surprisingly, sections of our cities have been abandoned to a
host of poverty-related social ills whose causes have as much to do
with the state of the national and regional economies, structural
changes in the job market, and political decision-making as they have
to do with individual life-histories and personal misfortune.2 The per-
vasiveness of today's social ills, their rapid escalation and concentra-
tion in urban areas and the failure of public officials to offer workable
solutions, suggests that my old community is rapidly becoming a mi-
crocosm of the ills of the nation. This bleak outcome was not inevita-
ble, and it can be reversed by understanding why faulty policy options
were adopted and what it will take to formulate new policies. In addi-
* David R. Jones is president and CEO of the Community Service Society of New
York. Former director of New York City's Youth Bureau, the author is a graduate of
Wesleyan University and the Yale University School of Law.
1. Quoted in Peter Applebome, Although Urban Blight Worsens, Most People Don't
Feel Its Impact, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1991, at A20.
2. For an excellent discussion of the diverse origins of poverty, see DAVID T. ELL-
WOOD, POOR SUPPORTS: POVERTY IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY (1988).
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tion, the lessons we have learned in New York City in fighting pov-
erty may be usefully applied nationwide.
As this essay suggests, solutions to the decline of our cities will
come only by marshaling economic forces differently, and by exercis-
ing alternative political and social choices. These in turn require mo-
bilizing coalitions prepared to fight for a massive, nationally
coordinated effort to end poverty and to rebuild urban America.
I. Defining the Dimensions of Poverty
The national and regional recession, the chronic lack of education
and job training, the virtual disappearance of blue-collar entry-level
jobs, the paucity of family supports for single female heads-of-house-
holds and the conscious decision by the federal government to aban-
don the inner cities have left more than one in four New Yorkers in
poverty. The number of the city's poor and the rate of increase are
accelerating by every indicator. The concentration of poverty in in-
ner-city neighborhoods has also grown, stripping the poor of their
political clout and leaving them unable to do much about it.
Children represent a particularly sympathetic population among
the urban poor. In recent years, it has become increasingly clear that
poverty among children is growing and shaping the future for New
York City. Of all city children, 37.4 % are poor. The number of chil-
dren under the age of eighteen living in poverty is increasing as well.3
This statistic differs significantly from the 19.9 % of the elderly popu-
lation who are poor.
Public assistance grants, a convenient target for politicians nation-
wide, are themselves inadequate and not adjusted for inflation. Since
1976, when the public assistance grant in New York State was essen-
tially frozen, and allowed for only minuscule subsequent increases,
public assistance recipients lost forty percent of their buying power.
While other federal programs such as supports for the elderly, have
been indexed, payments for Aid to Families with Dependent Children
("AFDC")4 are locked at 1976 levels.5 For example, in New York
City today, a parent and three children receiving a maximum annual
AFDC grant live on an annual income that is more than $5,100 below
the federal poverty threshold, a level that is itself unreflective of the
3. COMMUNITY SERVICE SOCIETY OF NEW YORK, A CHARTBOOK OF POVERTY
AND RELATED PROBLEMS IN NEW YORK CITY, Fig. 2 (1991) [hereinafter CHARTBOOK].
4. 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1988).
5. See PATRICIA SIMPSON, COMMUNITY SERVICE SOCIETY OF NEW YORK, LIVING
IN POVERTY: COPING ON A WELFARE GRANT 9-10 (1990).
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true costs of living in this expensive city. 6
This misery should move some to question the conservative argu-
ment that poverty is self-generating and that the poor are to blame for
their own condition. In fact, when other parts of the economy
boomed in the 1980s, and the elderly were relatively secure, the very
poor, and particularly poor children, were further impoverished.
Public schools were once thought to offer children a way out of
poverty. Today, over forty percent of the city's public school students
are from families on public assistance.7 The bulk of these youngsters
are black, Asian or Latino. Test results in school districts with the
highest percentages of poor children reveal the lowest levels of per-
formance in reading and math.8 The majority of public-school chil-
dren in Central Harlem and many other districts cannot read at grade
level. Contrary to facile explanations linking underachievement with
poverty or culture, such underachievement is due more likely to edu-
cational malfeasance.
The highest per capita expenditure on children's education is spent
in middle class areas outside of the city - more than double that
spent on the poor. Within the city, Staten Islanders receive substan-
tially more per capita for their children's education than do residents
of the South Bronx.
A report-in-progress by the Community Service Society of New
York demonstrates that the quality and caliber of the teaching staffs
assigned to poor children is dramatically inferior. Similarly, a RAND
Corporation report 9 shows a chronic national pattern indicating that
inner-city children receive an inferior math and science curriculum,
and that schools contain untrained instructors and inadequate materi-
als. These reports should refute the notion that a "culture of poverty"
is responsible for the lack of success of minority and poor children.
In every low-income New York City school district, less money is
spent to help poor children than is spent on the children of more afflu-
ent New Yorkers.' 0 Even if the "culture of poverty" argument was
cogent, it would make more sense to use funds to help overcome al-
leged cultural impediments than to withdraw resources.
6. The federal poverty line for a family of four in 1990 was $13,360. See
CHARTBOOK, supra note 3, at 1.
7. Id. at Fig. 4.
8. Id. at Fig. 5.
9. JEANNIE OAKES, MULTIPLYING INEQUALITIES: THE EFFECTS OF RACE, SOCIAL
CLASS, AND TRACKING ON OPPORTUNITIES TO LEARN MATHEMATICS AND SCIENCE
(1990).
10. See Nick Chiles, Kids, Schools and Color, in PRISM: A PERIODIC REPORT ON
RACE AND POLITICS IN NEW YORK CITY, Vol. 1, No. 1 (July 1991).
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Not surprisingly, the crisis in the education of the poor exists con-
currently with a crisis in housing. Despite declining home mortgage
rates, quality low-income housing is scarce, and the number of fami-
lies living doubled up or in shelters is increasing. As of August 15,
1991, there were a total of 4,693 families living in emergency housing,
an increase of forty-seven percent from June 1990.11
Children suffer when families cannot find adequate shelter. From
1980 to 1990, the annual number of child-abuse and neglect reports
nearly tripled, and the number of children placed in foster care
doubled, reaching 44,900.12 The deteriorating conditions and inap-
propriate placement of children in foster care, the lack of educational
supports, the constant shuffling of these children to and from different
homes, and the creation of a whole new class of people in poverty who
earn their living by housing children in foster care means almost cer-
tain dependency for these youngsters.
Another problem facing the impoverished children of America's
cities is poor health, which can be both a cause and a consequence of
poverty. Health conditions for poor New Yorkers are deteriorating as
poverty rates increase. After a dip in the mid-1980s, there was a dra-
matic increase in infant mortalities coupled with record high percent-
ages of low-birthweight infants.'
3
An historical indicator of the link between poverty and health, tu-
berculosis, ("TB"), is presently recurring at an alarming pace.
Although never eradicated - the highest level reached in recent years
was in 1963 - TB was thought to be largely eliminated in the early
part of this century. Incidence of TB in Harlem, Bedford-Stuyvesant
and Fort Greene is increasing dramatically. Unlike the HIV illness,
which can be cruelly written off as an outcome of practicing unsafe
lifestyles, TB infection is directly linked to malnutrition and to the
quality of living conditions in shelters, single-room occupancy dwell-
ings (SROs) and prisons. TB is not an isolated health problem, but the
ultimate infectious disease of the poor. Perhaps even more than
AIDS, the rise of TB in our cities is emblematic of the problems of
our times and the need for new social policies aimed at eliminating
poverty.14
11. See CHARTBOOK, supra note 3, at Fig. 10.
12. Id. at Fig. 6.
13. Id. at Fig. 7.
14. Now that doctors, social workers and other professionals servicing the poor risk
contracting TB, considerable attention is being drawn to the recurrence of the disease in
New York. See, e.g., Janice Hopkins Tanne, Q and A About TB, N.Y. MAG., Mar. 23,
1992, at 30; Tuberculosis: The Plague, ECONOMIST, Mar. 21, 1992, at 28.
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II. Identifying The Causes of Urban Decline
The principal burden for funding the programs we have proposed
will fall upon the federal government. Caught between an inade-
quate and shrinking tax base and accelerating demands for public
expenditures, the cities are not able to generate sufficient financing.
Although there is much more that state governments can and
should do, the taxing resources available at this level are far from
adequate. 5
Some argue that city problems are self-made. In his recent analysis
of its current budget woes, the Manhattan Institute's Peter Salins ar-
gues that New York City has wholly within its own means the capac-
ity to bring its budget into balance by dismantling the municipal
welfare state.' 6 Salins argues that the city need simply reverse costly
and ineffective public policy choices of the past years by doing away
with precisely those programs that attempt to meet the needs of its
most vulnerable citizens: low-income housing, foster care, AIDS serv-
ices and the like.' 7
Salins' argument loses ground when faced with those actual public
policy decisions that adversely affected urban America. While pov-
erty has a variety of social and personal causes, the decline of our
cities can be laid to two forces largely external to them: structural
changes in the economy exacerbated by recession and severely flawed
federal and state funding policies.
A. The Impact of a Failed Public Funding Policy
New York does not stand alone in its inability to provide resources
to stem poverty. Philadelphia has teetered precariously on the brink
of bankruptcy since the fall of 1990. Legislators in Harrisburg re-
cently agreed to place Philadelphia's finances under the control of a
newly created state authority similar to that instituted during New
York City's 1975 fiscal crisis. In an even more desperate act, the
mayor of Bridgeport, Connecticut, was so overwhelmed by the magni-
tude of her city's fiscal crisis that she attempted to do the unthinkable
by taking the city into bankruptcy instead of cutting needed services.
While the courts prevented Bridgeport's bankruptcy, the mayor's se-
vere actions indicate the fatalism shared by much of our urban leader-
ship. Hartford, Baltimore, Washington, DC, Newark, Camden, New
15. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS
(1968) (report of the Kerner Commission).
16. Peter Salins, Jump Starting New York, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 13, 1991, at 52.
17. Id. at 54.
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Jersey, Detroit and a host of other cities also face the specter of fiscal
stress which leads to severe social and economic problems.'" Far too
many of today's cities are plagued by decaying infrastructures, lost
jobs and high concentrations of unskilled, destitute populations.
Signs of decay have been widespread since the 1960s. Urban unrest
in the 1960s increased the flight of mostly white, middle-income resi-
dents to nearby suburbs, leaving behind a large segment of the poor,
racial and ethnic minorities, and the elderly. Consequently, as noted
in a 1991 analysis by the National League of Cities, poverty is increas-
ingly concentrated in urban centers.1 9 The report also states that over
the last decade:
the central city's share of the nation's poor increased from thirty-
seven to forty-three percent, or by six percentage points. The eco-
nomic recovery of the 1980s had little effect on the incidence of
poverty in central cities, and their share of the nation's poor in-
creased as the national economy grew. Although the proportion of
those in poverty in suburban areas increased ... sharp disparities
between central cities and suburbs in both rates and shares of pov-
erty remained at the end of the decade.2°
Accompanying this phenomenon was the withdrawal of manufac-
turing and its associated industries from the urban core. The loss of
blue collar, skilled and unskilled high-wage jobs in many of our larg-
est cities assisted in concentrating unemployment and poverty in met-
ropolitan areas. The growth of suburban populations and
concentrations of poverty in cities foreshadowed the loss of urban
political clout at the state and federal levels.
Today our cities are perceived by many to be vast wastelands, call-
ing to mind high crime rates, large-scale unemployment and poverty,
deteriorating housing and failing public-school systems. The percep-
tion of the inner city as a center of criminal activity has made cities
and their residents suspect in the eyes of the wider American public,
with large African-American and Latino populations falling victim to
both isolated predators and the criminal justice system. Even for
those suburbanites for whom the city has no negative connotation, it
also holds no attraction, and its problems appear to be those of some-
18. David E. Rosenbaum, States and Cities with Woes May Slow Rebound, N.Y.
TIMES, May 31, 1991, at A1; Michael deCourcy Hinds, Strapped Big Cities Take Painful
Steps, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1991, at 20; Michael deCourcy Hinds, Its Cash and Tempers
Short, Philadelphia Seeks Solvency, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1990, at Al.
19. LARRY C. LEDEBUR, NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES, CITY FISCAL DISTRESS:
STRUCTURAL, DEMOGRAPHIC AND INSTITUTIONAL CAUSES 10 (1991).
20. Id.
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one else.2 This transition from productive commercial centers to
consumers of scarce financial and other resources has weakened the
competitive advantage cities once held over their rural and suburban
counterparts.
Even the simple task of traveling within an urban center is daunt-
ing. Decaying roads, crumbling bridges and poorly maintained tun-
nels impede the movement of people, goods and services through the
central city. The beltway, an invention of highway planning in the
1970s, allows traffic to bypass inner cities in many metropolitan areas.
The physical remains of urban high-rise public housing stock is a con-
stant reminder that the valiant efforts of the 1950s and 1960s to house
low-income residents failed, at least in part.
Well-to-do residents who remain in the cities increasingly have
withdrawn their support for those institutions and activities that pro-
mote a greater sense of community and the common good. Harvard
economist Robert Reich calls this phenomenon the "secession of the
successful," where affluent and highly trained Americans:
in effect withdraw their dollars from the support of public spaces
shared by all and dedicate the savings to private spaces they share
with [others like themselves]. As public parks and playgrounds de-
teriorate, there is a proliferation of private health clubs, golf clubs,
tennis clubs, skating clubs, and every other type of recreational as-
sociation in which costs are divided among members. So also with
condominiums, cooperatives, and the omnipresent "residential
communities" which dun their members in order to undertake ef-
forts that financially strapped local governments can no longer af-
ford to do well-maintaining private roadways, mending
sidewalks, pruning trees, repairing streetlights, cleaning swimming
pools and paying for a lifeguard, and notably, hiring security
guards to protect life and property. 22
In general, cities are left to bear a greater proportion of their state's,
and thus the nation's, social and economic problems. Now having to
do far more with much less, cities are sinking under the combined
weight of this disproportionate burden.
B. The Effects of a Changing Economy
The nature and extent of changes in the economy of the United
21. See, e.g., William Glaberson, For Many in the New York Region, the City is Ig-
nored and Irrelevant, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1992, at Al.
22. ROBERT REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS: PREPARING OURSELVES FOR 21ST
CENTURY CAPITALISM 268-69 (1991).
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States has been much discussed and well-documented elsewhere.23
For the purposes of this essay, it is sufficient to note that the shift
away from industrially-based to service-based economies in the big
cities has left far too many inner-city residents behind. Either they
are underemployed, i.e., consigned to low-wage, dead-end jobs that
perpetuate their poverty,24 or they cannot find mainstream employ-
ment at all. Moreover, many residents are still faced with discrimina-
tory hiring practices. Studies conducted by the Community Service
Society in the middle and late 1980s detailing labor market segmenta-
tion in New York City's public and private sectors revealed that Afri-
can Americans and Latinos were confined to low-wage jobs in a
narrow range of occupations.25
Underemployment and discrimination are not the only disadvan-
tages which have resulted from the changing economy. As a final
consequence, the city itself has been left with a declining tax base and
a subsequent inability to meet basic service responsibilities.
C. The Federal Retreat
A less readily discussed but equally compelling cause of today's ur-
ban crisis is the federal government's near total abdication of respon-
sibility for the nation's social problems. During the 1980s, the federal
government pursued a policy of domestic disinvestment. Beginning
with the elimination of federal revenue-sharing in the late 1970s, fed-
eral withdrawal escalated under President Reagan's "New Federal-
ism." Intergovernmental aid was restructured to the disadvantage of
urban centers by decreasing the amount of unrestricted revenue-shar-
ing funds previously available to cities to use at their discretion.26
The federal government's share of total local resources peaked at
nine percent in 1978. By 1986, that figure had plummeted to 4.2 per-
cent. Much of this decline can be attributed to the Reagan adminis-
tration's elimination of general revenue-sharing in 1986. Federal aid
to local governments declined by 5.9 percent and 4.4 percent in 1986
23. See BARRY BLUESTONE & BENNETT HARRISON, THE DEINDUSTRIALIZATION
OF AMERICA (1985); WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE
INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY ch. 2 (1987).
24. Given the official poverty line of $13,360 in 1990 for a family of four, a full-time
job paying $5 per hour to a lone breadwinner would give the family a gross income of
only $10,400, nearly $2,000 below the official definition of poverty.
25. WALTER STAFFORD, COMMUNITY SERVICE SOCIETY OF NEW YORK, CLOSED
LABOR MARKETS: UNDERREPRESENTATION OF BLACKS, HISPANICS, AND WOMEN IN
NEW YORK CITY'S CORE INDUSTRIES AND JOBS (1985).
26. See generally TIMOTHY CONLAN, NEW FEDERALISM: INTERGOVERNMENTAL
REFORM FROM NIXON TO REAGAN (The Brookings Institution 1988).
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and 1987 respectively.27 This compares unfavorably to 1973 when
there was a 73.7 percent increase in local revenues from federal
sources. 28 This dramatic retraction of federal dollars, combined with
a long-lasting recession and declining tax revenues, forced states and
municipalities to strain under the burden of a severe budget crisis.
Cities and counties are struggling to provide services far beyond the
traditional housekeeping functions of law enforcement, fire protec-
tion, public works, sanitation and education. The booming 1980s
only masked negative social trends. During the '80s, cities and states
filled the void left by the federal government's retreat. In New York
City, for example, nearly 57,000 jobs were created, many of which
provided important human services. 29 The city undertook an ambi-
tious program to address the growing homeless problem. Today, in
the wash of a recession, the city's ability to provide these services is
compromised.
The retrenchment of federal government support has put additional
pressures on state governments to provide aid for distressed cities.
Reagan's legacy of "localizing" aid comes at the expense of state trea-
suries at a time when state governments are facing tremendous budget
deficits. In 1975, the state share of local government revenue stood at
thirty-two percent. Twelve years later, that share had declined
to twenty-nine percent in spite of rising demands from local
government. 30
It is estimated that more than half of the states will confront deficits
during the current recession. 31 The unstable situation at the state
level wreaks havoc upon cities that depend upon state aid to fund city
programs and provide needed services. State governments have also
emulated the federal government in their treatment of municipalities.
Like Washington, states have placed additional pressures on cities
through the imposition of costly mandates. In most states, no addi-
tional federal funding accompanies the mandates. There is a growing
"no pay, no mandate" movement among state legislators and civic
27. See LEDEBUR, supra note 19, at 11.
28. Among other things, this dramatic difference can be attributed to the practice of
revenue-sharing discussed previously. See supra note 26.
29. See Financial Plan, City of New York, Fiscal Years 1992-96, Vol. 1, at 1-7 (Office
of Management and Budget).
30. Executive Budget, City of New York, Fiscal Year 1976 (Office of Management
and Budget); Executive Budget, City of New York, Fiscal Year 1988 (Office of Manage-
ment and Budget).
31. See Michael Specter, The New Domestic Tug-of-War, WASH. POST NAT'L
WEEKLY EDITION, Apr. 8-14, 1991.
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leaders forcing state governments to assume some degree of financial
responsibility for their mandates.
This waterfall effect of pushing the fiscal burden downward has
weighed most heavily upon cities. During the past decade, many state
legislatures allowed municipalities greater discretion in using taxes to
raise needed revenue. Since 1980, the share of local revenues coming
from local resources has increased. In 1980, the local share stood at
slightly above sixty percent. At the beginning of President Reagan's
second term, the local share had increased to sixty-six percent. By the
time Reagan was preparing to leave office, the local share had risen to
sixty-seven percent.32
This increase in local support was made possible by an increase in
locally generated revenues and not simply a response to cutbacks in
federal aid. The National League of Cities' Larry Ledebur says that
"[d]uring this period, local governments were significantly increasing
the revenues they derived from their own sources. Between 1979 and
1987, locally generated revenues increased by 84.4 percent. '3 3 The
result has been that cities now are restricted in initiating prospective
taxes. With a disenchanted public persuaded that taxes, not low
wages or declining public services, are the chief social villain, elected
officials are choosing to cut services further rather than face angry
voters.
New York City has been under tremendous pressure due to the
changes in intergovernmental support over the last decade. In Fiscal
Year 1974-1975, federal categorical grants represented 18.52 percent
of city revenue. In that same year, state categorical grants repre-
sented 27.75 percent of New York City revenue in FY 74-75. The
share of local revenue from unrestricted aid (federal revenue-sharing
and state revenue-sharing) was 6.09 percent.
This contrasts significantly with Fiscal Year 1991. Federal categor-
ical grants represented 9.79 percent of total revenue, down by almost
fifty percent from FY 74-75. State categorical grants made up 20.2
percent of revenue in 1991, an almost thirty percent reduction. The
share of local revenue drawn from unrestricted aid stood at only 2.4
percent. In 1974-1975, federal and state aid represented 52.4 percent
of total New York City revenue. That figure stood at only 32.5 per-
cent in fiscal year 1991.
34
32. See LEDEBUR, supra note 19, at 14.
33. Id. at 15.
34. Executive Budget, City of New York, Fiscal Year 1975 (Office of Management
and Budget); Executive Budget, City of New York, Fiscal Year 1991 (Office of Manage-
ment and Budget).
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There is also a sense that some states and cities are paying more
than their fair share of federal taxes and receiving little in return.
This is particularly true in the case of New York State. In 1991, Sen-
ator Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New York released a report detail-
ing the relationship between New York State and federal government
expenditures since 1977. One of the highlights of the report is the
description of the balance of payments between the state and the fed-
eral government. Moynihan examines the matter of equity in terms of
federal taxes paid and federal outlays received. In his report, Moyni-
han indicates that New York State ranked sixth among states in taxes
paid, at $5,096 per capita, in Fiscal Year 1990. In terms of federal
outlays, New York ranked twenty-first, receiving only $3,918 per cap-
ita. New York State thus had a negative balance of payment of
$1,178 per capita."
D. The Impact of Federal Disinvestment
The magnitude and implications of federal disinvestment are best
seen by examining specific areas that underwent significant reduc-
tions. Education may be the most frightening example. Federal sup-
port for elementary and secondary education dropped by a third in
the 1980s.36 Aid to higher education was cut as well. Guaranteed
Student Loans were pared by thirteen percent while tuition rose
twenty-six percent on average. a7 Funding for Head Start, one of the
most enduring and effective anti-poverty programs, shrank so signifi-
cantly by 1989 that only one in five poor three- and four-year-olds
could participate. This is a particularly egregious public policy be-
cause the program costs a mere $4,000 per child and has demonstra-
ble and long-lasting positive effects on the life chances of poor
youngsters.38
Another key area of federal abandonment is in housing assistance.
This category has been cut by over two-thirds, from more than $24
billion in 1981 to only $8 billion in 1988. 31 Perhaps the starkest evi-
dence of skewed federal priorities is the inversion the country exper-
ienced between 1980 and 1987 in which federal expenditures for
human resources declined from twenty-eight percent to just twenty-
two percent of federal outlays, while defense spending spiraled up-
35. SEN. DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, REFLECTIONS AT FIFTEEN: NEW YORK
STATE AND THE FEDERAL FIsC: XV (July 28, 1991).
36. See REICH, supra note 22, at 256.
37. Id. at 257-58. This average includes both public and private universities.
38. Id. at 257.
39. KEVIN PHILLIPS, THE POLITICS OF RICH AND POOR 251 (1990).
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ward from twenty-three to twenty-eight percent.40
III. The Need for Proactive Solutions
A. A "Marshall Plan" for Cities
There are those, such as Michigan Congressman John Conyers,
who call for a "Marshall Plan" to save the cities. Conyers has taken
the lead in organizing an urban caucus in Congress to address the
needs of our nation's cities. The Michigan representative has also
sponsored legislation to create new mechanisms that would facilitate
the delivery of federal aid to our cities.41
Some mayors are also fighting back. New York City Mayor David
Dinkins has been instrumental in forging a coalition of urban mayors
to lobby Congress and the White House for increased federal aid.
Last year Dinkins convened an "urban summit" for the purpose of
developing a comprehensive agenda for cities.42
At a follow-up meeting in Washington, D.C. during the spring of
1991, thirty-five mayors joined members of Congress and agreed to
work for a nine billion dollar anti-recession package of federal pro-
grams to aid America's cities.43 Among other things, components in-
cluded emergency anti-recession funding for urban centers;
improvement of national infrastructure and transportation programs;
and increase in funding for the Administration's Head 'Start program
in the form of a three billion dollar urban school-aid bill. This unified
effort by America's leaders signals a positive change with regard to
federal aid for urban centers.
B. Politics as a Mechanism for Change
Budget crises do not only affect city residents and their govern-
ments. There are thousands of non-profit agencies which contract
with cities and states for the provision of community-based services.
In times of budgetary stress, the dollars funding such services are all
too often offered up first in the gap-closing frenzy.
A coalition of those most affected by the cuts can get results. The
urban poor, their non-profit social service agency advocates, labor un-
ions representing both municipal workers devastated by fiscal cut-
40. Id. at 87.
41. H.R. 3601, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
42. See Jack Sirica, Dinkins Kicks Off Lobbying for Cities, N.Y. NEWSDAY, May 16,
1991, at 132; Terence J. Kivlan, Dinkins Goes to Fedsfor Help, STATEN ISLAND ADVO-
CATE, May 16, 1991, at 3.
43. See Urban Summit Mayors Receive Pledges of Support for America's Cities from
Congressional Leaders, URBAN SUMMIT PRESS RELEASE, May 16, 1991.
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backs and private sector employees reeling from the recession, can
foster change by voicing their concerns through an organized lobby.
In addition, traditional civil rights, ethnic and human rights organiza-
tions, and even sympathetic business groups, can be effective in bring-
ing about new policies.
Greater levels of political pressure need to be placed on elected offi-
cials at all levels of government. As the late political scientist Harold
Laswell said, politics is the mechanism by which we determine "who
gets what, when, how."' Political decisionmaking is about how we
choose to allocate society's resources, benefits and sanctions-what
Laswell referred to as the formation of "influence."
The current budget politics of New York City and State amply
demonstrate Laswell's point. For the past two fiscal years, both the
state and the city have wrestled with massive budget deficits. How-
ever, the range of deficit reduction possibilities under serious discus-
sion in Albany and City Hall remained unrealistically narrow. "Gap-
closing" plans offered by both the governor and the mayor rely dis-
proportionately on service reductions and eliminations. Revenue en-
hancement, the favored euphemism for new taxes, is a dirty phrase.
Simply put, the poor and their allies have little influence, so it is easier
politically to shift the burden for deficit reduction on those least able
to withstand it because they appear least able to resist it. Given to-
day's anti-government, conservative climate, politicians know that
taxes levied to sustain or renew investments in human needs are
anathema with voters,45 or at least with the majority of those voting in
local elections.
If the decline of our cities is not part of a "natural history" but the
result of poor planning and mistaken policies, then changed policies
can yield different results. It is beyond the purview of this paper to
sketch a blueprint for political change, but tentative comments can be
offered. A major obstacle toward making politicians responsive to
constituent needs is the large number of citizens unregistered to vote.
Political scientists have argued persuasively that conservative political
domination in the 1980s was based not on a genuine realignment of
political forces, or on voter apathy, but on the legal impediments
"progressive" coalitions face when mobilizing their constituencies to
vote.46 Streamlining voter registration would itself significantly open
up the political process to disadvantaged constituencies.
44. HAROLD D. LASWELL, POLITICS: WHO GETS WHAT, WHEN, How? (1936).
45. Witness the case of New Jersey Governor Jim Florio as he attempted to reshuffle
resources around the state.
46. See generally RICHARD CLOWARD & FRANCIS Fox PIVEN, WHY AMERICANS
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What is required is a shift in the political balance. Public officials
who purport to represent vulnerable urban constituencies need to feel
enough heat generated from previously weaker interests to force them
to consider alternative policy decisions. Consequently, in the grand
old American log-rolling tradition, they can put pressure on their
counterparts to win back some of the policy losses from which we are
now suffering.
C. The Role of Nonprofit Social Agencies
Community service organizations and other nonprofit agencies can
help move this political agenda, but because of their nonprofit status 47
they must do so cautiously. These traditional charities have a rich
history of softening the impact of social, political and economic forces
on society's weakest and most disenfranchised citizens. Their "good
works" deepen the concept of the commonweal and provide a means
for expressing a commitment by thousands of volunteers and profes-
sionals towards doing something tangible to end another citizen's
misery.
There are a number of non-partisan political activities in which
community service organizations can be involved, at little or no cost,
to make their presence felt in the political process. Voter registration
and "get-out-the-vote" efforts in their communities, direct and grass-
roots lobbying efforts and the formation of issue-based, non-partisan
coalitions are useful, workable and necessary adjuncts to these organi-
zations' traditional direct service and research components.
Such activities also aid in mobilizing the politically "locked out"
with a number of salutary results. As more residents become active
politically, the normal political calculus of local elections is upset.
Further, new community-based leadership emerges out of this height-
ened political activity, shaking entrenched and less-responsive leaders
out of their lethargy. Most directly, community mobilizations rein-
force accountability of public officials-the basis on which popular
DON'T VOTE (1988). See also THOMAS FERGUSON & JOEL ROGERS, THE DECLINE OF
THE DEMOCRATS AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1986).
47. Exemptions from tax on income and tax deductibility of contributions to non-
profit agencies are granted under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, which creates
a strong public subsidy for their charitable missions and programs. See I.R.C. § 501
(c)(3) (1988). Because of this tax subsidy, such organizations are prohibited from engag-
ing in partisan political activities such as attempts to support one candidate over another
in a given election. While there is no prohibition against direct or grassroots lobbying by
501(c)(3) organizations, this activity is subject to some regulation. For example, organi-
zations planning to engage in lobbying may only allocate a limited portion of their budg-
ets to lobbying efforts.
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sovereignty is predicated. At bottom, increased voter activism serves
notice that more diverse community interests expect to be "at the ta-
ble" when deals are cut.
Clients of community service organizations and the larger constitu-
encies of these organizations benefit greatly from successful, well-
planned lobbying efforts. The essential message sent by a lobbyist is
that the politician has something at stake and that it is in the official's
interest to respond creatively to constituent needs. While nonprofit
organizations cannot, and should not, be advocates of particular par-
ties or candidates, they can play an enormous role in framing the ide-
ological issues of the day, creating a rational level of discourse on
which societal needs can be met and helping citizens mobilize to exer-
cise influence in meeting those needs.

